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The Pakistan National Alliance Participants and Prospects

Secret

RP 77-10220

August 1977

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The Pakistan National Alliance Participants and Prospects

Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence

August 1977

C The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) appears to have the edge on its opponents in the race for the national and provincial assembly elections scheduled for 18 October. The nine-party alliance, formed on 11 January, has so far maintained a high degree of unity, despite the deep differences among its members. It has done so by concentrating on the one point on which its members are in complete agreement—the need to defeat former Prime Minister Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Once in power, this coalition of Islamic conservatives, secular nationalists, and provincial autonomists will face issues which could quickly bring basic disagreements to the surface and threaten to split the Alliance.

The Religious Parties

C Pakistan is 97 percent Muslim, and religion plays an important part in the lives of most Pakistanis, but the religious parties have had little success in their attempts to win public office. Pakistani voters tend to doubt the ability of the religious leaders to govern, and even many of those who favor making Pakistan a more Islamic country believe the programs of the religious parties are too extreme.

C Success for the Islamic parties has also been hindered by disagreements among their leaders which have historically prevented the formation of an Islamic front. Furthermore, all of the major religious parties are oriented toward Sunni Islam, which limits their appeal to the

quarter of the population that is Shiah, the other main branch of Islam.

C *Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)*. The Congregation of Islam, founded in 1941 by Maulana Syed Abdul Ala Maudoodi, is probably Pakistan's best organized and most cohesive party. Maudoodi, because of his advanced age, has relinquished the leadership of the party to others but still has considerable influence. Tofail Mohammed is the current chairman, but another member, Professor Ghaffoor Ahmed, the secretary general of the PNA, has been far more prominent in recent months.

C The party seeks to reorganize Pakistani society in accordance with a strict interpretation of Islamic law and custom. It tends toward a pan-Islamic rather than nationalistic point of view which, in the 1940s, lay behind its failure to support efforts to create Pakistan, something its more nationalist opponents frequently point out.


C Although the party is well disciplined, it has limited popular support and has not done well in elections. It is strongest in the Punjab and has developed some following among non-Sindhis in the Sind, but it is very weak in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier.

C *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)*. The Society of the Ulema (religious leaders) of Islam has its greatest strength in the North-West Frontier Province, where its leader, Mufti Mahmood, who is also president of the PNA, headed a coalition government in 1972-73.

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C Like the JI, the JUI seeks to transform Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. Both parties favor free enterprise, but the JUI is more sympathetic toward socialism. It is, however, more conservative than the JI on issues such as motion pictures and the role of women in society.

C *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP)*. The Society of the Ulema of Pakistan, led by Shah Ahmed Noorani, was formed by dissidents from the JUI in 1969. It draws on a much more mystic interpretation of Islam than the other two major Islamic parties. Much of its political strength derives from the support of local pirs (saints), the belief in whom the JI maintains is heresy.

C Although also seeking to establish an Islamic state, the JUP is far more nationalistic than the JI or JUI. It is strongest in the Punjab, where it elected four delegates to the National Assembly in 1970. All later defected to Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, but, with Bhutto in trouble, the party might well regain those seats.

C *Kaksar Tehriq*. The Kaksar Movement, headed by Hadji Safaraz Khan, was founded in 1930 as a paramilitary organization dedicated to Islamic dominance in the subcontinent. Although some of its members and sympathizers have held public office, it is not strictly a political party and played little part in either the last election campaign or in the agitation and negotiations which followed. Presumably it would have, at most, a very minor role in any Alliance government.

The Nationalists

C The secular nationalist parties in the Alliance (as well as Bhutto's PPP) reflect the basic outlook of most Pakistanis, at least the 80 percent of the population that lives in the Sind and the Punjab. From the time Pakistan attained independence 30 years ago, the nation's rulers—whether soldiers or civilians—have placed national interests ahead of those of the provinces and pragmatism ahead of doctrine in their economic and social policies. They have based their foreign policies on the threat from India

and have supported Islam—although usually more because they see it as a force for national unity than because of any deep personal belief.

C The voters have supported men with such an outlook in the past and are likely to continue to do so. Policy differences among the secular nationalists are at times important to the voters, but they are more likely to base their choice on their assessment of the candidates' character, personality, and prestige.

C *Pakistan Muslim League*. The Pakistan Muslim League—the party responsible for the creation of Pakistan—has fallen on hard times after dominating the country's politics for most of its first quarter century. When it ruled, its programs were highly nationalistic, mildly socialistic, and basically secular.

C Its strength was based on the support of local political leaders, many of them more interested in the benefits of association with the ruling party than in its ideology. Corruption and an inability to solve Pakistan's economic problems eroded its popular support, and defections and divisions had reduced it to little more than a platform for a few aging politicians at the time of the formation of the PNA.

C The present Muslim League faction in the PNA is led by the Pir of Pagaro and has retained some potential as a rallying point. (Another faction, under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan remains outside the PNA.) There have already been defections from Bhutto's PPP, which is composed largely of former Muslim Leaguers, but most have yet formally to join another party. Although membership in the more powerful Tehriq-i-Istiqlal might be more profitable in the long run for the PPP defectors, they are likely to find a warmer welcome and be more comfortable in one of the factions of the much less moralistic Muslim League.

C *Tehriq-i-Istiqlal*. The Solidarity Movement, founded in 1970 and still dominated by former Air Force commander Asghar Khan, is probably the single most important party in the Alliance. During the last election campaign, Asghar emerged as the leading spokesman for the

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opposition. Later, during the negotiations with Prime Minister Bhutto on holding a new election, he was able to convince his more moderate colleagues in the Alliance to go along with his refusal to compromise. The Tehriq will probably receive a significant share of the places on the PNA slate, and many Pakistanis see Asghar as the country's probable next prime minister.

Asghar's devotion to principle and his incorruptibility are both his greatest political asset and his greatest liability. In a country where most politicians are regarded—usually correctly—as motivated primarily by self-interest and a willingness to do almost anything for a price, Asghar stands out as a man who can be trusted to do what he believes is right.



Air Marshal Asghar Khan
Tehriq-i-Istiqal leader

On the other hand, he has great difficulty making the deals that are the life blood of Pakistani politics, and at various times—such as when he once quit politics in disgust—

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Asghar is a strong nationalist and an advocate of major improvements in Pakistan's defense capabilities. He favors moderately socialistic economic policies, although his land reform program would go far beyond what the Bhutto government attempted and could alienate many local political leaders, most of whom are landowners.

Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). The Pakistan Democratic Party was formed by several small parties, including the Pakistan Democratic Movement (itself a coalition including Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan's splinter of the once powerful Awami League and a small religious party), and the Justice Party, founded and later abandoned by Asghar Khan.

Much of the PDP's strength was in East Pakistan, and following the division of the country in 1971, there were major defections from the West Pakistani remnant because of disagreement over Pakistani policies toward Bangladesh.

The PDP would win few if any seats running on its own—in 1970, the only National Assembly seat it won was in East Pakistan—but Nasrullah Khan, the party leader and vice president of the PNA, probably has more influence in the Alliance than his party's popular support warrants.

The party takes a fairly moderate stance on most issues—regional autonomy in the context of national unity, land reform which would hurt only the large landowners, nationalization of some—but hardly all—industries, and turning Pakistan more toward Islam, but not to the extent advocated by the major religious parties.

All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference is technically not Pakistani, but a major party in Azad Kashmir, that part of Kashmir

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under Pakistani control but theoretically independent. The party, headed by former Azad Kashmir president Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, favors the union of all Kashmir with Pakistan following a plebiscite throughout the state. When it was in power, it generally followed the policies laid down for it by Islamabad.

C The Conference was the ruling party in Azad Kashmir in 1975, when Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto engineered Qayyum's removal from the presidency. Soon afterward, in an election which the Conference boycotted, the pro-Bhutto Azad Kashmir People's Party gained control of the legislature. The Conference expects to regain control of the state in an election scheduled to be held in October.

The Provincial Autonomists

C Punjabis have generally dominated Pakistani politics, even though no Punjabi has actually headed a government since the late 1950s. Although there has been some resentment of Punjabi dominance in the Sind, the viewpoints of the people in the two provinces are close enough so that no major problems have arisen.

C Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, however, have a long tradition of resistance to control by the central government—the Punjabis and their Sindhi allies—and their efforts to seek greater provincial autonomy have been a greater or lesser problem for all Pakistani governments.

C *National Democratic Party (NDP).* The National Democratic Party was founded in 1975, a few months after Bhutto banned the National Awami Party (NAP) and arrested many of its leaders including Khan Abdul Wali Khan, at that time the most prominent of the opposition leaders. Bhutto charged the party with plotting the secession, with Afghan backing, of Baluchistan and the NWFP.

C Although Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, the present NDP leader, was not a member of the NAP, most other party leaders were, and Wali Khan's wife plays a more prominent role in party affairs than Mazari. The NAP and NDP, in fact, are virtually identical.



Wali Khan
Imprisoned leader of the NAP

C The NAP historically has been three parties, each having little in common with the others. In the Sind and the Punjab, it was a small, almost insignificant collection of extreme leftists, despite Wali's efforts to build a national following.

C/SNF In the North-West Frontier, it was the party of the Pathans and the most important party in the province. It favored much greater provincial autonomy, and some of its members may have hoped eventually to unite the province with Afghanistan. Although extreme leftists were a small minority in the Frontier NAP, at least one prominent party member was a Communist.

C In Baluchistan, the NAP was the vehicle of the generally conservative leaders of the major Baluchi's tribes. Their main objective was the protection of their traditional powers from both the provincial government—which they controlled until Bhutto intervened in 1973—and

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from the central government. The party was, in fact, so thoroughly Baluch that the Pathans in the northern part of the province formed a splinter NAP of their own.

The Allies of the Alliance

C Two other parties have announced that they will support the Alliance, although no formal arrangements have been worked out and might well be difficult.

C All Pakistan Muslim League (QML). The Muslim League faction headed by Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan (not to be confused with the leader of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference) had some strength in the Sind and Punjab, but its major support was in those areas of the North-West Frontier where Pakistani nationalism was a greater force than Pathan separatism. Qayyum has been a rival of the provincial autonomists since his successful efforts to include the Frontier Province in Pakistan despite the strong opposition of Wali Khan's father and uncle.

C The Qayyum Muslim League's programs are almost identical to those of the Muslim League headed by the Pir of Pagaro, but there is little love lost between the two groups. Qayyum broke with the other party in the 1960s, and his later service as interior minister in Bhutto's cabinet further worsened his relations with Alliance leaders. The delegate to the National Assembly elected by the QML in 1977, has announced that the party has merged with the Pir's Muslim League, but other party officials have denied this.

C Jiye Sind Mazar. It is unlikely that the Alliance either sought or wants the support of G. M. Syed's Sindhi nationalists now united under the name of the Long Live Sind Front. A rabid defender of the Sind, and one whose pronouncements raise some questions about his sanity, Syed is likely to be more of a liability than an asset. He might be able to win some votes from the Sindhis who have supported Bhutto in the last two elections, but only through vitriolic attacks on the non-Sindhi

groups in the province who have previously been the Alliance's most dependable supporters.

An Alliance Government

C Should the Pakistan National Alliance win the election in October, the government that would be formed would almost certainly be dominated by the nationalists. Although the nationalists would control the government in Islamabad, and presumably the provincial governments in the Sind and the Punjab as well, provincial autonomists would almost certainly gain control in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier.

C Even with goodwill on both sides, some tension in relations between the latter two provincial governments and the federal government seems inevitable. The leaders of the NDP, moreover, have often distrusted Asghar and the Muslim Leaguers, and the failure of these Alliance spokesmen to make a serious effort for the release of Wali Khan has probably increased this hostility. Most of the politicians jailed by Bhutto were released either during the negotiations which preceded the military coup or soon afterward by the martial law administration, but Wali's treason trial drags on.

C Many of the nationalists would see the NDP's efforts for greater provincial autonomy as a prelude to secession, and the government might well find itself under pressure from the military to exert stronger control over provincial affairs. An open confrontation between the bulk of the Alliance and the NDP would be difficult to avoid, and if the Alliance's victory margin in October is slim, an open break could leave Pakistan with a minority government.

C Other threats to Alliance unity will be more manageable. The religious parties are certain to press for reforms to make Pakistan into the Islamic state they have long desired, and the nationalists will probably be willing to make the cosmetic changes requested. If the religious parties demand more basic changes—such as the abolition of the banking system (which violates

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Islamic law by paying and charging interest)—there would be a confrontation in which at least some of the religious leaders almost certainly would leave the Alliance.

C Asghar Khan seems likely to dominate the nationalists, and through them the government, even if someone else becomes prime minister. He may, however, have difficulty controlling his fellow nationalists, including those in his own party. Few of them have the strength of character of Asghar and will find it hard to resist the temptations of office. Eventually a major confrontation could develop either because of an attempt to ease the too honest Asghar from power or because of an attempt by Asghar to cleanse the government.

C Foreign policy is unlikely to be a major cause of disagreement in an Alliance government. Fear of India and the need for foreign aid will continue to determine the direction of foreign relations. The religious parties, despite some misgivings about dealing with atheists, will probably not object to continued good relations with Peking because of the importance of Chinese political and military support. All parties—although not necessarily for the same reasons—will support efforts to strengthen ties with other Islamic countries. An Alliance government may well be more disposed than

Bhutto's to maintaining good relations with the US, although it will be reluctant to be seen as bowing to foreign pressure on issues such as the acquisition of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France. Only relations with Afghanistan could cause major disagreement within the Alliance, but trouble with Kabul—which has supported the provincial autonomists in the past—is more likely to be the result than the cause of a falling out between the nationalists and the NDP.

C Few of the major Alliance leaders are noted for their political skill. Asghar has great difficulty in compromising, the religious leaders are prone to bitter disputes with each other as well as with other party leaders, and Wali Khan and the other provincial autonomists have used confrontation as a major political weapon in the past. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, probably a more skillful politician than anyone in the Alliance, will do his utmost to encourage their differences.

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29 August 1977

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